A Comparative Analysis of COVID-19 and Black Death of the Mid-14th Century

Global Policy Insights Publication accessible here. Posted On Tuesday May 26, 2020.

A Comparative Analysis of COVID-19 and Black Death of the Mid-14th Century Pandemics like any major crisis, bring shockwaves that change the world order. In the mid-14th century, the black death or the bubonic plague triggered such trends that altered the very nature of the socio-economic system of the times. To use a colloquialism, the world was never the same again. The black death created structural changes in the society. It altered regional balances where the economic leadership shifted from the southern Mediterranean states in Europe such as Tuscany, Florence and Valencia to northwestern urban centres such London, Antwerp and Holland. The Black Death also led to profound social changes such as the entering of women into the workforce in northwestern Europe. It led to many a technological advancement such as the invention of the Guttenberg movable press. And finally, perhaps most importantly, it triggered the decline of feudalism and put Europe on the path to capitalism, as has been argued by many historians. With such profound social, economic, political and technological changes that were triggered by the Black Death – the largest pandemic in terms of expanse and death toll, that the world has seen so far – there is cause enough to believe that the current COVID-19 pandemic will also be a key contributing factor in changing the social, political, and economic relations in the world. The world as we know it will never remain the same. Before analyzing the social, political, and economic consequences of the black death in the endeavour to draw some lessons from the current covid pandemic, it may be worthwhile to understand the nature, expanse and the origins of these two health emergencies across the world. Firstly, it is the nature of the disease that sets both the pandemics apart. The corona or novel COVID-19 is a virus spread in human beings through bats, while the black death was caused by bacterium Yersina pestis, a bacterium found on flees that infested rodents, especially rats. Secondly, it is worth noting that while the bubonic plague of the 14th century wreaked havoc by killing nearly a third to a fourth of the affected population by conservative estimates, the fatality rate of COVID-19 is about 3.67% in a worst case scenario. Thirdly, where the coronavirus lacks in fatality rates, it makes up in its expanse. It has spread across nearly all continents and about 185 countries, while the black death was largely restricted to Europe, North Africa and parts of Asia. Fourthly, while the black death took its toll on the young and young adult working population, the corona death toll is greater with the elderly or the children who do not form the typical labour force. Fifthly, the origin of both pandemics can be traced back to China – the Black death has been traced back to China,1 especially the province of Yunnan, while the origins of the coronavirus have been traced to the province of Wuhan in the same country. Finally, it may be noted that the origins of both the pandemics can be traced to the complex interactions between humans, animals, and the environment at large. Figure 1. Spread of the Black Death in Europe and the Near East (1346–1353)

A Comparative Analysis of COVID-19 and Black Death of the Mid-14th Century Pandemics like any major crisis, bring shockwaves that change the world order. In the mid-14th century, the black death or the bubonic plague triggered such trends that altered the very nature of the socio-economic system of the times. To use a colloquialism, the world was never the same again. The black death created structural changes in the society. It altered regional balances where the economic leadership shifted from the southern Mediterranean states in Europe such as Tuscany, Florence and Valencia to northwestern urban centres such London, Antwerp and Holland. The Black Death also led to profound social changes such as the entering of women into the workforce in northwestern Europe. It led to many a technological advancement such as the invention of the Guttenberg movable press. And finally, perhaps most importantly, it triggered the decline of feudalism and put Europe on the path to capitalism, as has been argued by many historians. With such profound social, economic, political and technological changes that were triggered by the Black Death – the largest pandemic in terms of expanse and death toll, that the world has seen so far – there is cause enough to believe that the current COVID-19 pandemic will also be a key contributing factor in changing the social, political, and economic relations in the world. The world as we know it will never remain the same. Before analyzing the social, political, and economic consequences of the black death in the endeavour to draw some lessons from the current covid pandemic, it may be worthwhile to understand the nature, expanse and the origins of these two health emergencies across the world. Firstly, it is the nature of the disease that sets both the pandemics apart. The corona or novel COVID-19 is a virus spread in human beings through bats, while the black death was caused by bacterium Yersina pestis, a bacterium found on flees that infested rodents, especially rats. Secondly, it is worth noting that while the bubonic plague of the 14th century wreaked havoc by killing nearly a third to a fourth of the affected population by conservative estimates, the fatality rate of COVID-19 is about 3.67% in a worst case scenario. Thirdly, where the coronavirus lacks in fatality rates, it makes up in its expanse. It has spread across nearly all continents and about 185 countries, while the black death was largely restricted to Europe, North Africa and parts of Asia. Fourthly, while the black death took its toll on the young and young adult working population, the corona death toll is greater with the elderly or the children who do not form the typical labour force. Fifthly, the origin of both pandemics can be traced back to China – the Black death has been traced back to China,1 especially the province of Yunnan, while the origins of the coronavirus have been traced to the province of Wuhan in the same country. Finally, it may be noted that the origins of both the pandemics can be traced to the complex interactions between humans, animals, and the environment at large. Figure 1. Spread of the Black Death in Europe and the Near East (1346–1353)

Source: Wikimedia Commons Figure 2. Total confirmed COVI-19 cases per million people, May 12, 2020

Source: Our World in Data It is indeed a wonder to note how the interaction of human beings and animals with the phenomenon of climate change can lead to profound socio-economic changes. These interactions have, in the past altered the very structure of regional balances and the world order and have altered socio-economic systems no lesser than feudalism and have sealed their fate. There is much, as one learns, in the nature of animals, the environment and our relationship with them that defines our politics, economics and the society. The endeavour of this essay is firstly to identify such relations while building a greater sense and appreciation for understanding the links between the environment and our socio-political and economic structures; and secondly, to draw comparisons between the black death and the covid 19 pandemic with an eventual aim of attempting a tentative preemption of the changes that the current COVID pandemic may bring about in the way human beings organize themselves socially, economically and politically. Climate, Animals and Humans: The Supply Chain of Pandemics Many, if not most diseases in humans are caused by “zoonoses”, i.e., they have their origins in animals (See Table 1). Zoonoic diseases, in turn, are linked to extreme weather events and human interactions with the environment. Boris V. Schmid et al., “Climate-Driven Introduction of the Black Death and Successive Plague Reintroductions into Europe” have explained how successive waves of black death in Europe were caused by changing environmental factors in China and Central Asia. They explain that certain climatic conditions gave rise to the increased population of gerbil (rats) – a phenomenon scientifically known as the Moran effect – around central Asia from the late thirteenth century. The fleas on these rodents were the careers of the bacterium and as the rodents increased in density and came in contact with human settlements (especially urban centres), the plague began to spread into human populations. However, the largescale spread of the plague took place when climatic conditions changed again in a manner that led to the decline of the rodent population. “As gerbil populations collapse in response to climatic changes, the density of fleas per gerbil increases dramatically … causing fleas to seek out alternative hosts, including humans and their domestic animals.” 2 Schmid et al. emphasize that it was the conjunction of wet weather along with the presence of transport routes (silk route – roads and seaways) that led to the spread of the bubonic plague in the human population. Figure 3. Four Main Types of transmission Cycles of Infectious Diseases

Source: World Health Organization

Similarly, Xu et al. based on historical spatio-temporal dryness/wetness data report that: “… wet conditions, as measured by flood and drought events, facilitated spatial spread of human plague in China. Wet weather may have increased human contact with plague vectors, for example rodents, and caused the migration of people who had lost their homes in floods. All of these factors may have promoted the spatial transmission of plague.”3 In a somewhat prescient tone in their paper written in 2015, they go on to warn that “newly opened transportation routes, for example the Qinghai-Tibet railway in China … connect the natural foci of plague”.4 While the relationship of the bubonic plague with human activity was one of unintended consequences, it seems that the later spread of diseases such as AIDS, SARS, and even the coronavirus is more directly linked to human activity and its intervention with animals’ natural habitat. Peter Daszak, a disease ecologist in a New York Times Article has observed that “Any emerging disease in the last 30 or 40 years has come about as a result of encroachment into wild lands and changes in demography.”5 Kalpish Ratna in a recent article explain the origin of coronavirus as a result of human encroachment over the forest areas: “Southeast Asia has lost over 30 per cent of forest cover in recent years. The deforested land is intensively cultivated. Urban growth is invasive. This abrupt proximity between humans and bats allows a greater exposure to the viruses shed in bat saliva and guano [excrement], and a rapidly diversifying spectrum of viruses, too.”6 Many other diseases such as the Lyme disease, AIDS, ZICA virus, malaria, Ebola, SARS etc. are all outcomes of the complex interactions between human beings and the environment. In a study Pike et al. note that “the traditional practice of hunting and butchering nonhuman primates continues to be a gateway for the zoonotic transmission of retroviruses.”7 However, there are any such factors that can be found in the relationship between the human beings and the nature, that can explain the spread of diseases (see table 1). Table 1: Examples of how diverse environmental changes affect the occurrences of various infectious diseases in human beings (WHO)

Source: World Health Organization Now when we have established how the environment and human interaction gives rise to pandemics, it becomes possible to see how these human-environmental interactions shape socio-economic and political realities. This is what we shall discuss in the next section. Figure 4. Origins of human coronaviruses with possible intermediate hosts

Source: Wikimedia Commons Impact of Pandemics on Human Social, Economic and Political Structures While the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic is still unfolding, it is worth noting that the bubonic plague or the black death that hit Europe in successive waves starting in the mid fourteenth century led to a spate of socio-economic and political changes. Among them are the decline of feudalism and the transition of Europe into capitalism, the passing of economic and eventually political leadership of Europe from the Mediterranean city states to the urban centres of Northwestern Europe, the absorption of women in the workforce of Northwestern urban centres, and many technological advancements. For ease of analysis, it is worthwhile to discuss two broad trends in the context of the changes brought about by the bubonic plague in Europe – (a) transition from feudalism to capitalism; and (b) the regional shift in economic and political leadership from Mediterranean to Northwestern Europe. Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism As noted earlier, a key ramification of the bubonic plague was the acute decline in the working population. Estimates of lives lost during the black death range from 25% to 50% of the European population. Historians like M. M. Postan, H. J. Habbakuk, W. Abel and Le Roy Ladurie, taking their cue from Robert Malthus, have explained the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a result if the demographic changes, one of the major triggers for which was the black death of the medieval times.9 The demographic crises, according to them created a shortage of labour which meant a significant reduction in the income of the landed gentry, who in their turn responded by modifying their methods of surplus extraction in many different ways. In some places (especially eastern Europe) new forms of bondage were imposed on the peasants and the serfs, while in other places (majorly in Western Europe) the landlords transformed the feudal dues, which were hitherto collected in form of bonded physical labour (corvee) on the landlords farmlands, into money rents thereby unleashing a new wave of monetization in the rural economy. The advent of money rents in place of the traditional payment of dues in form of physical labour on the private lands of the feudal lord, it is argued led to the marketization of the economy and eventually gave birth to the capitalistic mode of production. With the physical labour transformed into money rent along with the access to markets, there was greater opportunity for the peasants to sell surplus grain in market and even buy their own freedom. Thus, with the wage labourer rose the tenant farmer, who when gained access to the market for their grain and labour in the medieval towns, quickly prompted the process of dismantling the local, self-sufficient and demonetized structure of the feudal mode of production. Figure 5. Extract from the plague-era Second Statute of Laborers, 1351

Source: British National Archives, C 74/1, m. 18 (1351) Nevertheless, the process of the decline of feudalism was not as smooth or immediate as it may seem. In England for example, after a massive loss of population due to the plague in 1348-50, there was a rise in overall wage rates and yet the feudal lords did not seem to mind this as there was a concomitant rise in prices of agricultural produce, thereby keeping their profits intact. The landed gentry did bring in the Statute of Labourers in 1351 to address the problem of labour shortage setting upper limits of various kinds of waged labourers, it was not strictly enforced until 1375. In the year 1375, however, something changed and there was greater demand from the landlords to enforce the Statute of Labourers. A.R. Bridbury in his study “The Black Death” published in the Economic History Review in 1973, discusses that what changed around 1375 was that this year saw the best harvest in the past twenty six years and the “India summer was struck by a frost”. ). Good harvests meant increased supply, and since wages remained stickily high, it meant that the profits of the demesne farmers were compromised. It was then that the landed gentry pushed for the amendment of the labour legislations of 1351 so that they may be applied with greater strictness. Even though the legislation was in place since 1351, Bridbury explains, that the unharmed profits of the landowners did not call for a strong implementation of the Statutes. However, their failure to convince the king to strengthen and enforce these statutes was their ruin and the undoing of the demesne farming system. As they pressed harder on the peasants with their demands and increased taxes, the limits of the feudal coercion was reached and there were the infamous peasant revolts in England in the year 1381. The revolts were brutally suppressed but led to the rise of a serious pursuance of labour laws and labour related reforms in England. Indeed, it also led to the ultimate decline of the feudal socio-economic structure. However, the results were not uniform across Europe. In eastern Europe, for example, “the growing scarcity of tenants after the Black Death also initiated a long and protracted struggle which was won by the lords and led to the intensification of the lord-tenant bonds or the establishment of the so-called second serfdom.”11

Figure 6. Pieter Bruegel's The Triumph of Death (reflects the social upheaval and terror that followed plague, which devastated medieval Europe)

Source: British National Archives, C 74/1, m. 18 (1351) Regional Shift in Political and Economic Leadership from Mediterranean to Northwestern Europe Studies have shown how the black death created regional imbalances in Europe. The hitherto prosperous Mediterranean cities declined while northwestern Europe began to emerge as a centre of greater economic activity and technological superiority which left the Italian city states much behind in the following decades. In a paper “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” 12 Sevket Pamuk states that: “Tuscany was among the most developed regions of Europe before the Black Death with a rate of urbanisation of up to 40 per cent and an industrial, commercial and financial metropolis of over 100,000 inhabitants. A century later, the economy of Tuscany was stagnating and Florence was quickly sliding down the urban ranks while Holland was being transformed into one of the most advanced, urbanised and commercialised regions of the continent.”13 According to Pamuk, what enabled late medieval Holland to respond rapidly to the new economic opportunities was its unusual degree of institutional flexibility. He quotes S.R. Epstein to argue that while the monopolistic institutions were strengthened as a response to the black death in Tuscany, they got loosened up in Holland. As a result, the Northwestern urban centres such as London, Paris, Antwerp, Holland etc. grew at a breakneck pace due to weakened monopolies while those in the Italian peninsula such as Tuscany, Florence, and Valencia stagnated by 1450s. In Northwestern Europe, it also meant that guilds devoid of the instruments of monopoly and under a high wage and low labour availability condition, in order to be more productive, had to undertake technological innovations. “The guilds were open to technological innovation and we should expect that many of the labour-saving innovations in the era of the Black Death took place within the guilds which became more flexible in its aftermath”.14 Indeed, the Gutenberg press and even firearms were inventions of this era. Scarcity, high cost of labour, and the inability of guilds to impose monopolies thus triggered labour saving innovations in the Northwestern Europe. Another institution that transformed in favour of the Northwestern European states was the inclusion of women into the workforce. In England, the Statute of Labourers 1351 unequivocally demanded women to work: “… men as well as women, should be bound to serve, receiving the customary salary and wages in the places where they are bound to serve in the twentieth year of the reign [1347] of the king that now is, or five or six years before, and that the same servants refusing to serve in such a manner should be punished by imprisonment of their bodies, as is more plainly contained in the said statute.”15 The inclusion of women in the workforce was not however, due to a concern for social justice, but for economic interests – to make up for the loss of labour caused due to the black death. Yet, there were unintended positive outcomes of this trend of including women in the workforce. According to Pamuk, in Northwestern Europe, women started to get married late and the fertility declined in a manner that the population remained low and wages therefore sustained at a higher level for an extended period of time. The population of England did not revive to the pre-black death levels until much later.” With higher mortality and lower fertility, the northwestern parts of Europe seem to have escaped the “Malthusian trap” in later centuries”, remarks Pamuk. However, the population of Italy and Spain bounced back more quickly because women “continued to marry at a lower age, in fact the age at marriage may even have declined after the Black Death; the larger age gap between males and females at the time of marriage persisted; and the fertility behaviour appears not to have changed very much.” 16 This could partly be explained by the traditions of Catholicism in Italy and Spain, while the Northwestern states had already abandoned it in favour of Protestantism. Nevertheless, this meant the continuation of high wage environment in England, Netherlands, and Belgium for a longer duration as compared to Italy and Spain. Table 2. Population of selected European countries, 1300-1800 (in thousands) as quoted in Pamuk (2007)

The high wage environment in the northwest coupled with the weakening of monopolies meant a greater need to innovate and therefore we see greater technological innovations coming from the northwestern parts of Europe from the fifteenth century. It is thus, that the plague caused the “Great Divergence” across Europe. COVID-19 Socio-Economic and Regional Impact The above analysis of the Black Death raises a few questions in terms of the COVID Pandemic:

• Just like the Black Death led to a dismantling of the feudal mode of production, will COVID-19 result in a dismantling of the capitalistic mode of production?

• Just like the Black Death caused regional leadership to shift from Mediterranean Europe to Northwestern Europe, will COVID19 lead to a shift in global leadership from the United States to another country, potentially, China?

Many factors led to the decline of the feudal mode of production that may be associated with the Black Death. To begin with, as discussed, the Malthusian explanation is that the feudal mode of production that was based on extra-economic coercion, crumbled apart as the number of working populations reduced. When the landlords could not have possibly gained the same levels of productivity through forced labour, they switched to receiving payments in money. The cost of getting work done on farms (wages) went up beyond the affordability limits of the landlords, who in turn put an upper cap on wages, which led the peasants to revolt. Unlike the feudal times, firstly, there is lesser fatality in the productive workforce in the corona pandemic, however, the productivity for many sectors has indeed come down. We may broadly consider two types of sectors: Many factors led to the decline of the feudal mode of production that may be associated with the Black Death. To begin with, as discussed, the Malthusian explanation is that the feudal mode of production that was based on extra-economic coercion, crumbled apart as the number of working populations reduced. When the landlords could not have possibly gained the same levels of productivity through forced labour, they switched to receiving payments in money. The cost of getting work done on farms (wages) went up beyond the affordability limits of the landlords, who in turn put an upper cap on wages, which led the peasants to revolt. Unlike the feudal times, firstly, there is lesser fatality in the productive workforce in the corona pandemic, however, the productivity for many sectors has indeed come down. We may broadly consider two types of sectors: 1. Sectors where remote work is possible (RWP) 2. Sectors where remote work is not possible (RWP’) On a global level, the sectors wherein remote work is not possible are greater than the sectors where remote work is possible in terms of size and employment. So, RWP’>RWP Considering that lockdowns may become “part of life”, i.e. various regions in the world may come in and out of lockdowns for a sustained period of time, the effect of low productivity in COVID-19 would be similar to the loss of lives of the workforce. Indeed, there are indications already that the wage rates (WR) have already dipped or have stagnated. So, WRc ≤ WRc-1 WRc ≥ WRc+1 {where WRc = Wage Rates in and immediately after the lockdown period; WRc-1 = Wage Rates in the pre-corona period; WRc+1 = Wage rate after considerable time post the lockdown period} For simplicity let us assume that wage rates fell in real terms during the lockdown period and since wages are sticky, they may not rise quickly enough after the lockdown period. WRc < WRc-1 WRc = WRc+1 This is opposite to the trends of Black death where wage rates in the post black death period (WRb) were higher than the wage rates in the pre-black death period (WRb-1) and since they were sticky, they did not fall considerably, let us say after 1375 in England (WRb+1). WRb ≥ WRb-1 WRb-1 = WRb+1 If we look at inflation rates, the inflation rates in the post corona world may remain high as compared to the rates in the pre-corona times as it may take supply some time to catch up with demand. However, the inflation rates will normalize over time. So, IRc-1 < IRc IRc+1 < IRc {Where, IRc-1 = Inflation rate before the corona pandemic; IRc = Inflation rate during and for a while after the lockdown; IRc+1 = Inflation rate after a considerable period after the lockdown} This is similar to what happened in the case of black death where the inflation rate during the blackdeath was greater than the inflation rate before and a few years after its occurrence as we can see in the case of England where the shortage of produce remained until 1375. So, IRb-1 < IRb IRc+1 < IRc {Where, taking the case of England IRb-1 = Inflation rate before the black death; IRb = Inflation rate during and for a while after the black death until 1374; IRb+1 = Inflation rate after the good harvest of 1375} In the black death, an adverse reaction ensued from 1375 when there was a good produce because given the same rate of wages and high supply of produce in the market, the profit function of the landlords was minimized. P b-1 ≥ P b (profits reduce or are at the same levels after black death considering inflation) P b > P b+1 (profits reduce in good harvests, wages stay the same  coercion of peasants) {Where, taking the case of England Pb-1 = Profit before the black death; Pb = Profit during and for a while after the black death until 1374; Pb+1 = Profit after the good harvest of 1375} Wherein, generally, P is the differentia between IR and W: P = IR – W In case of Corona, for companies where employees can work from home i.e. the RWP scenario: P c-1 ≤ P c (profits increase or stay the same as pre-covid levels because of rise in inflation and lowering of wages) P c > P c+1 (profits reduce marginally due to decrease in inflation but the wage rates are still low and do not bounce back to pre-covid levels) While this may seem like a loss for the companies that can work remotely because there is a reduction in the increased profit after the lockdown period, it is still a situation where wages remain low so the reduction in interest rates does not but so much into profits. However, since losses loom larger than gains, this comparative loss due to lowering inflation even though wage rates remain sticky and low may seem like a pain for the firms where remote work is possible. These firms from their reference point of high inflation and low wages during and immediately following the lockdown period may feel that they are at a loss and many ask the government for relief packages or even layoff employees. For companies where remote work is not possible, i.e. the RWP’ scenario, P c-1 > P c (they are unable to work during the pandemic so P c is zero or negative) P c < P c+1 (some production begins perhaps due to some stimulus from the government and either marginal profits are generated or losses are reduced) Here we can see that under both, RWP and RWP’ scenarios there is no collapse of system in the best case scenario where RWP’ firms can gain enough funds from the government to start operating again. In the worst case scenario, many RWP’ firms stop operating altogether and cannot be bailed out by the government. Hence, it may be possible that a decline in the unorganized manufacturing sector may be incipient, especially if a bailout from the government does not happen. Yet some service industries of the RWP’ type may still survive and those manufacturing units which are able to gain some infusion of funds (whether through a government bailout or any other means) - large enough to get them back into operations. In any case, a complete breakdown of a capitalist structure does not seem to be on the cards. However, countries (or areas) with a high density of RWP’ manufacturing industries in the unorganized sector, may witness decline. At the same time countries where there is a high concentration of high technology industries, may even remain sanguine. In terms of modes of production, it seems that the earlier forms of industries with hard core manufacturing jobs, with unorganized and semi-organized structures and where labour’s physical presence is of critical importance, may see a decline. At the same time, industries which sprang up as part of what is popularly termed as the industrialization 4.0 may recuperate and thrive. For countries where a large number of people are rendered jobless, there may be exacerbated challenges of keeping their population financially afloat until an economic innovation in the mode of production takes place. Now let us move to our second question of regional differences which has a few sub-questions as well: Scholars like Epstein and Pamuk have explained regional differences through the lens of institutions. We shall take a mixed approach and look at both, institutions and capabilities keeping a few regions in mind – USA, China, India, ASEAN, and Europe. The ongoing debate is generally around the hegemonic challenge of China to the USA and whether the latter will be able to maintain its hegemony or will the balance of power and economic leadership tilt in favour of China? Some have argued from a capabilities perspective considering that since supply chains in China are relatively unharmed by he COVID crisis, whether other countries like them or not they will cooperate with them (China). From this perspective, China’s soft power would develop post facto once the world realizes that they have to live under Chinese dominance. The world will be able to rationalize and/or may operate under cognitive dissonance. Figure 7. US President Donald Trump and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu sign the Phase One Trade Deal in January 2020

Source: Wikimedia Commons On the other hand, many argue that China by delaying the news of the corona outbreak to the world has lost on account of legitimacy and soft power by behaving irresponsibly. Since soft power is of strategic importance, China has lost on a key strategic advantage. From this perspective, it may be argued that other nations will actively reduce their stakes in China and will find other nations where they can rebuild their supply chains profitably. Whether due to the lack of trust or simply due to the fear of another health crisis in China, or both, companies are moving out of China and are investing in other countries after the COVID outbreak. As per many estimates, India, the ASEAN region, and other developing countries are to gain from it. Indeed there is a need to bring into analysis the whole institution of globalization and its impact on trade, allocation of resources etc. While many argue that the Coronavirus may lead to de-globalization, it may be necessary to keep in mind the distinctions between globalization and internationalization – as Peter Katzenstein has argued. According to Rawi Abdelal and Adam Seigal, the “institutional foundations of globalization-such as the rules that oblige governments to keep their markets open and the domestic and international politics that allow policymakers to liberalize their economies-have weakened considerably in the past few years”.19 However, internationalization, “i.e. exchanges across borders can and will continue, even as the transformative ideological process of breaking down barriers slows considerably”.20 These observations, seem to ring true and may even lead to multiple centres or blocs in the world enjoying regional power and leadership at least for the coming decades – much like how the world functioned in the 13th century in the pre-black-death era (only with different divisions of regional groups and now with more international contact and communication – internationalization). Figure 8. The 13th century world-system, as described by Janet Abu-Lughod

Source: Wikimedia Commons A comparative analysis of the critical institutions of the United States, Europe, India, ASEAN, and China is a research enterprise that may give more sophisticated answers to the questions of global leadership. From the perspective of demographic analysis, the United States and in general the west may witness the outward migration of labour during the pandemic and their return may not be early enough. At any rate, the inward immigration into the United States will reduce considerably given the travel bas and strict border policies. This would mean that the United States would need to depend even more on labour saving technological innovations. If the US could avoid monopolistic tendencies, then it could gain from technological innovation amidst lower availability (or lower growth rate) of working population. Similar trends may take place in western Europe as well. In a way, while the black death reversed existing economic and power structures, the COVID crisis may make existing economic and power structures more acute or prominent. References 1-> Nicholas Wade, “Europe’s Plagues Came From China, Study Finds,” The New York Times, October 31, 2010, sec. Health, 2-> Boris V. Schmid et al., “Climate-Driven Introduction of the Black Death and Successive Plague Reintroductions into Europe,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 112, no. 10 (2015): 3020–25. 3-> Ibid 4-> Ibid 5-> Jim Robbins, “The Ecology of Disease,” The New York Times, sec. Sunday Review, accessed May 17, 2020 6-> “When the Wild Moves in,” The Week, accessed May 17, 2020 7-> Brian L. Pike et al., “The Origin and Prevention of Pandemics,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 50, no. 12 (2010): 1636–40. 8-> “WHO | Climate Change and Human Health - Risks and Responses. Summary.,” WHO, accessed May 17, 2020, 9-> Past And Present Publications: The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure And Economic Development In Pre-Industrial Europe,” accessed May 18, 2020, 10-> A. R. Bridbury, “The Black Death,” The Economic History Review 26, no. 4 (1973): 577–92, 11-> Robert brenner quoted by ŞEVKET PAMUK, “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 3 (2007): 289–317. 12-> ŞEVKET PAMUK, “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 3 (2007): 289–317. 13-> Ibid 14-> Ibid 15-> “The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland [1807-1868/69],” accessed May 18, 2020, 16-> ŞEVKET PAMUK, “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 3 (2007): 289–317. 17-> Ibid 18-> Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 19-> Rawi Abdelal and Adam Segal, “Has Globalization Passed Its Peak?,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007): 103–14. 20-> Ibid Bibliography Abdelal, Rawi, and Adam Segal. “Has Globalization Passed Its Peak?” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007): 103–14. “Black Death.” In Wikipedia, May 17, 2020. Bridbury, A. R. “The Black Death.” The Economic History Review 26, no. 4 (1973): 577–92. Freedom and Growth: The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300-1750. 1 edition. London ; New York: Routledge, 2000. McCormick, Michael. “Rats, Communications, and Plague: Toward an Ecological History.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 34, no. 1 (2003): 1–25. PAMUK, ŞEVKET. “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600.” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 3 (2007): 289–317. Pike, Brian L., Karen E. Saylors, Joseph N. Fair, Matthew LeBreton, Ubald Tamoufe, Cyrille F. Djoko, Anne W. Rimoin, and Nathan D. Wolfe. “The Origin and Prevention of Pandemics.” Clinical Infectious Diseases 50, no. 12 (2010): 1636–40. “Past And Present Publications: The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure And Economic Development In Pre-Industrial Europe | Google Shopping.” Accessed May 18, 2020. Pham, Hau V, Dat T Dang, Nguyen N Tran Minh, Nguyen D Nguyen, and Tuan V Nguyen. “Correlates of Environmental Factors and Human Plague: An Ecological Study in Vietnam.” International Journal of Epidemiology 38, no. 6 (December 2009): 1634–41. Pike, Brian L., Karen E. Saylors, Joseph N. Fair, Matthew LeBreton, Ubald Tamoufe, Cyrille F. Djoko, Anne W. Rimoin, and Nathan D. Wolfe. “The Origin and Prevention of Pandemics.” Clinical Infectious Diseases 50, no. 12 (2010): 1636–40. Robbins, Jim. “The Ecology of Disease.” The New York Times, sec. Sunday Review. Accessed May 17, 2020. Schmid, Boris V., Ulf Büntgen, W. Ryan Easterday, Christian Ginzler, Lars Walløe, Barbara Bramanti, and Nils Chr. Stenseth. “Climate-Driven Introduction of the Black Death and Successive Plague Reintroductions into Europe.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 112, no. 10 (2015): 3020–25. “Climate-Driven Introduction of the Black Death and Successive Plague Reintroductions into Europe.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 112, no. 10 (2015): 3020–25. “The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland [1807-1868/69].” Accessed May 18, 2020. Wade, Nicholas. “Europe’s Plagues Came From China, Study Finds.” The New York Times, October 31, 2010, sec. Health The Week. “When the Wild Moves in.” Accessed May 17, 2020. WHO. “WHO | Climate Change and Human Health - Risks and Responses. Summary.” Accessed May 17, 2020. Wiechmann, Ingrid, Ole Jørgen Benedictow, Raffaella Bianucci, and Sacha Kacki. “History of the Plague.” RCC Perspectives, no. 3 (2012): 63–74. Xu, Lei, Leif Chr. Stige, Kyrre Linné Kausrud, Tamara Ben Ari, Shuchun Wang, Xiye Fang, Boris V. Schmid, Qiyong Liu, Nils Chr. Stenseth, and Zhibin Zhang. “Wet Climate and Transportation Routes Accelerate Spread of Human Plague.” Proceedings: Biological Sciences 281, no. 1780 (2014): 1–9.

Source: Wikimedia Commons Figure 2. Total confirmed COVI-19 cases per million people, May 12, 2020 Source: Our World in Data It is indeed a wonder to note how the interaction of human beings and animals with the phenomenon of climate change can lead to profound socio-economic changes. These interactions have, in the past altered the very structure of regional balances and the world order and have altered socio-economic systems no lesser than feudalism and have sealed their fate. There is much, as one learns, in the nature of animals, the environment and our relationship with them that defines our politics, economics and the society. The endeavour of this essay is firstly to identify such relations while building a greater sense and appreciation for understanding the links between the environment and our socio-political and economic structures; and secondly, to draw comparisons between the black death and the covid 19 pandemic with an eventual aim of attempting a tentative preemption of the changes that the current COVID pandemic may bring about in the way human beings organize themselves socially, economically and politically. Climate, Animals and Humans: The Supply Chain of Pandemics Many, if not most diseases in humans are caused by “zoonoses”, i.e., they have their origins in animals (See Table 1). Zoonoic diseases, in turn, are linked to extreme weather events and human interactions with the environment. Boris V. Schmid et al., “Climate-Driven Introduction of the Black Death and Successive Plague Reintroductions into Europe” have explained how successive waves of black death in Europe were caused by changing environmental factors in China and Central Asia. They explain that certain climatic conditions gave rise to the increased population of gerbil (rats) – a phenomenon scientifically known as the Moran effect – around central Asia from the late thirteenth century. The fleas on these rodents were the careers of the bacterium and as the rodents increased in density and came in contact with human settlements (especially urban centres), the plague began to spread into human populations. However, the largescale spread of the plague took place when climatic conditions changed again in a manner that led to the decline of the rodent population. “As gerbil populations collapse in response to climatic changes, the density of fleas per gerbil increases dramatically … causing fleas to seek out alternative hosts, including humans and their domestic animals.” 2 Schmid et al. emphasize that it was the conjunction of wet weather along with the presence of transport routes (silk route – roads and seaways) that led to the spread of the bubonic plague in the human population. Figure 3. Four Main Types of transmission Cycles of Infectious Diseases Source: World Health Organization Similarly, Xu et al. based on historical spatio-temporal dryness/wetness data report that: “… wet conditions, as measured by flood and drought events, facilitated spatial spread of human plague in China. Wet weather may have increased human contact with plague vectors, for example rodents, and caused the migration of people who had lost their homes in floods. All of these factors may have promoted the spatial transmission of plague.”3 In a somewhat prescient tone in their paper written in 2015, they go on to warn that “newly opened transportation routes, for example the Qinghai-Tibet railway in China … connect the natural foci of plague”.4 While the relationship of the bubonic plague with human activity was one of unintended consequences, it seems that the later spread of diseases such as AIDS, SARS, and even the coronavirus is more directly linked to human activity and its intervention with animals’ natural habitat. Peter Daszak, a disease ecologist in a New York Times Article has observed that “Any emerging disease in the last 30 or 40 years has come about as a result of encroachment into wild lands and changes in demography.”5 Kalpish Ratna in a recent article explain the origin of coronavirus as a result of human encroachment over the forest areas: “Southeast Asia has lost over 30 per cent of forest cover in recent years. The deforested land is intensively cultivated. Urban growth is invasive. This abrupt proximity between humans and bats allows a greater exposure to the viruses shed in bat saliva and guano [excrement], and a rapidly diversifying spectrum of viruses, too.”6 Many other diseases such as the Lyme disease, AIDS, ZICA virus, malaria, Ebola, SARS etc. are all outcomes of the complex interactions between human beings and the environment. In a study Pike et al. note that “the traditional practice of hunting and butchering nonhuman primates continues to be a gateway for the zoonotic transmission of retroviruses.”7 However, there are any such factors that can be found in the relationship between the human beings and the nature, that can explain the spread of diseases (see table 1). Table 1: Examples of how diverse environmental changes affect the occurrences of various infectious diseases in human beings (WHO) Source: World Health Organization Now when we have established how the environment and human interaction gives rise to pandemics, it becomes possible to see how these human-environmental interactions shape socio-economic and political realities. This is what we shall discuss in the next section. Figure 4. Origins of human coronaviruses with possible intermediate hosts Source: Wikimedia Commons Impact of Pandemics on Human Social, Economic and Political Structures While the impact of the COVID 19 pandemic is still unfolding, it is worth noting that the bubonic plague or the black death that hit Europe in successive waves starting in the mid fourteenth century led to a spate of socio-economic and political changes. Among them are the decline of feudalism and the transition of Europe into capitalism, the passing of economic and eventually political leadership of Europe from the Mediterranean city states to the urban centres of Northwestern Europe, the absorption of women in the workforce of Northwestern urban centres, and many technological advancements. For ease of analysis, it is worthwhile to discuss two broad trends in the context of the changes brought about by the bubonic plague in Europe – (a) transition from feudalism to capitalism; and (b) the regional shift in economic and political leadership from Mediterranean to Northwestern Europe. Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism As noted earlier, a key ramification of the bubonic plague was the acute decline in the working population. Estimates of lives lost during the black death range from 25% to 50% of the European population. Historians like M. M. Postan, H. J. Habbakuk, W. Abel and Le Roy Ladurie, taking their cue from Robert Malthus, have explained the transition from feudalism to capitalism as a result if the demographic changes, one of the major triggers for which was the black death of the medieval times.9 The demographic crises, according to them created a shortage of labour which meant a significant reduction in the income of the landed gentry, who in their turn responded by modifying their methods of surplus extraction in many different ways. In some places (especially eastern Europe) new forms of bondage were imposed on the peasants and the serfs, while in other places (majorly in Western Europe) the landlords transformed the feudal dues, which were hitherto collected in form of bonded physical labour (corvee) on the landlords farmlands, into money rents thereby unleashing a new wave of monetization in the rural economy. The advent of money rents in place of the traditional payment of dues in form of physical labour on the private lands of the feudal lord, it is argued led to the marketization of the economy and eventually gave birth to the capitalistic mode of production. With the physical labour transformed into money rent along with the access to markets, there was greater opportunity for the peasants to sell surplus grain in market and even buy their own freedom. Thus, with the wage labourer rose the tenant farmer, who when gained access to the market for their grain and labour in the medieval towns, quickly prompted the process of dismantling the local, self-sufficient and demonetized structure of the feudal mode of production. Figure 5. Extract from the plague-era Second Statute of Laborers, 1351 Source: British National Archives, C 74/1, m. 18 (1351) Nevertheless, the process of the decline of feudalism was not as smooth or immediate as it may seem. In England for example, after a massive loss of population due to the plague in 1348-50, there was a rise in overall wage rates and yet the feudal lords did not seem to mind this as there was a concomitant rise in prices of agricultural produce, thereby keeping their profits intact. The landed gentry did bring in the Statute of Labourers in 1351 to address the problem of labour shortage setting upper limits of various kinds of waged labourers, it was not strictly enforced until 1375. In the year 1375, however, something changed and there was greater demand from the landlords to enforce the Statute of Labourers. A.R. Bridbury in his study “The Black Death” published in the Economic History Review in 1973, discusses that what changed around 1375 was that this year saw the best harvest in the past twenty six years and the “India summer was struck by a frost”. ). Good harvests meant increased supply, and since wages remained stickily high, it meant that the profits of the demesne farmers were compromised. It was then that the landed gentry pushed for the amendment of the labour legislations of 1351 so that they may be applied with greater strictness. Even though the legislation was in place since 1351, Bridbury explains, that the unharmed profits of the landowners did not call for a strong implementation of the Statutes. However, their failure to convince the king to strengthen and enforce these statutes was their ruin and the undoing of the demesne farming system. As they pressed harder on the peasants with their demands and increased taxes, the limits of the feudal coercion was reached and there were the infamous peasant revolts in England in the year 1381. The revolts were brutally suppressed but led to the rise of a serious pursuance of labour laws and labour related reforms in England. Indeed, it also led to the ultimate decline of the feudal socio-economic structure. However, the results were not uniform across Europe. In eastern Europe, for example, “the growing scarcity of tenants after the Black Death also initiated a long and protracted struggle which was won by the lords and led to the intensification of the lord-tenant bonds or the establishment of the so-called second serfdom.”11 Figure 6. Pieter Bruegel's The Triumph of Death (reflects the social upheaval and terror that followed plague, which devastated medieval Europe) Source: British National Archives, C 74/1, m. 18 (1351) Regional Shift in Political and Economic Leadership from Mediterranean to Northwestern Europe Studies have shown how the black death created regional imbalances in Europe. The hitherto prosperous Mediterranean cities declined while northwestern Europe began to emerge as a centre of greater economic activity and technological superiority which left the Italian city states much behind in the following decades. In a paper “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” 12 Sevket Pamuk states that: “Tuscany was among the most developed regions of Europe before the Black Death with a rate of urbanisation of up to 40 per cent and an industrial, commercial and financial metropolis of over 100,000 inhabitants. A century later, the economy of Tuscany was stagnating and Florence was quickly sliding down the urban ranks while Holland was being transformed into one of the most advanced, urbanised and commercialised regions of the continent.”13 According to Pamuk, what enabled late medieval Holland to respond rapidly to the new economic opportunities was its unusual degree of institutional flexibility. He quotes S.R. Epstein to argue that while the monopolistic institutions were strengthened as a response to the black death in Tuscany, they got loosened up in Holland. As a result, the Northwestern urban centres such as London, Paris, Antwerp, Holland etc. grew at a breakneck pace due to weakened monopolies while those in the Italian peninsula such as Tuscany, Florence, and Valencia stagnated by 1450s. In Northwestern Europe, it also meant that guilds devoid of the instruments of monopoly and under a high wage and low labour availability condition, in order to be more productive, had to undertake technological innovations. “The guilds were open to technological innovation and we should expect that many of the labour-saving innovations in the era of the Black Death took place within the guilds which became more flexible in its aftermath”.14 Indeed, the Gutenberg press and even firearms were inventions of this era. Scarcity, high cost of labour, and the inability of guilds to impose monopolies thus triggered labour saving innovations in the Northwestern Europe. Another institution that transformed in favour of the Northwestern European states was the inclusion of women into the workforce. In England, the Statute of Labourers 1351 unequivocally demanded women to work: “… men as well as women, should be bound to serve, receiving the customary salary and wages in the places where they are bound to serve in the twentieth year of the reign [1347] of the king that now is, or five or six years before, and that the same servants refusing to serve in such a manner should be punished by imprisonment of their bodies, as is more plainly contained in the said statute.”15 The inclusion of women in the workforce was not however, due to a concern for social justice, but for economic interests – to make up for the loss of labour caused due to the black death. Yet, there were unintended positive outcomes of this trend of including women in the workforce. According to Pamuk, in Northwestern Europe, women started to get married late and the fertility declined in a manner that the population remained low and wages therefore sustained at a higher level for an extended period of time. The population of England did not revive to the pre-black death levels until much later.” With higher mortality and lower fertility, the northwestern parts of Europe seem to have escaped the “Malthusian trap” in later centuries”, remarks Pamuk. However, the population of Italy and Spain bounced back more quickly because women “continued to marry at a lower age, in fact the age at marriage may even have declined after the Black Death; the larger age gap between males and females at the time of marriage persisted; and the fertility behaviour appears not to have changed very much.” 16 This could partly be explained by the traditions of Catholicism in Italy and Spain, while the Northwestern states had already abandoned it in favour of Protestantism. Nevertheless, this meant the continuation of high wage environment in England, Netherlands, and Belgium for a longer duration as compared to Italy and Spain. Table 2. Population of selected European countries, 1300-1800 (in thousands) as quoted in Pamuk (2007) The high wage environment in the northwest coupled with the weakening of monopolies meant a greater need to innovate and therefore we see greater technological innovations coming from the northwestern parts of Europe from the fifteenth century. It is thus, that the plague caused the “Great Divergence” across Europe. COVID-19 Socio-Economic and Regional Impact The above analysis of the Black Death raises a few questions in terms of the COVID Pandemic:

• Just like the Black Death led to a dismantling of the feudal mode of production, will COVID-19 result in a dismantling of the capitalistic mode of production?

• Just like the Black Death caused regional leadership to shift from Mediterranean Europe to Northwestern Europe, will COVID19 lead to a shift in global leadership from the United States to another country, potentially, China?

Many factors led to the decline of the feudal mode of production that may be associated with the Black Death. To begin with, as discussed, the Malthusian explanation is that the feudal mode of production that was based on extra-economic coercion, crumbled apart as the number of working populations reduced. When the landlords could not have possibly gained the same levels of productivity through forced labour, they switched to receiving payments in money. The cost of getting work done on farms (wages) went up beyond the affordability limits of the landlords, who in turn put an upper cap on wages, which led the peasants to revolt. Unlike the feudal times, firstly, there is lesser fatality in the productive workforce in the corona pandemic, however, the productivity for many sectors has indeed come down. We may broadly consider two types of sectors: Many factors led to the decline of the feudal mode of production that may be associated with the Black Death. To begin with, as discussed, the Malthusian explanation is that the feudal mode of production that was based on extra-economic coercion, crumbled apart as the number of working populations reduced. When the landlords could not have possibly gained the same levels of productivity through forced labour, they switched to receiving payments in money. The cost of getting work done on farms (wages) went up beyond the affordability limits of the landlords, who in turn put an upper cap on wages, which led the peasants to revolt. Unlike the feudal times, firstly, there is lesser fatality in the productive workforce in the corona pandemic, however, the productivity for many sectors has indeed come down. We may broadly consider two types of sectors: 1. Sectors where remote work is possible (RWP) 2. Sectors where remote work is not possible (RWP’) On a global level, the sectors wherein remote work is not possible are greater than the sectors where remote work is possible in terms of size and employment. So, RWP’>RWP Considering that lockdowns may become “part of life”, i.e. various regions in the world may come in and out of lockdowns for a sustained period of time, the effect of low productivity in COVID-19 would be similar to the loss of lives of the workforce. Indeed, there are indications already that the wage rates (WR) have already dipped or have stagnated. So, WRc ≤ WRc-1 WRc ≥ WRc+1 {where WRc = Wage Rates in and immediately after the lockdown period; WRc-1 = Wage Rates in the pre-corona period; WRc+1 = Wage rate after considerable time post the lockdown period} For simplicity let us assume that wage rates fell in real terms during the lockdown period and since wages are sticky, they may not rise quickly enough after the lockdown period. WRc < WRc-1 WRc = WRc+1 This is opposite to the trends of Black death where wage rates in the post black death period (WRb) were higher than the wage rates in the pre-black death period (WRb-1) and since they were sticky, they did not fall considerably, let us say after 1375 in England (WRb+1). WRb ≥ WRb-1 WRb-1 = WRb+1 If we look at inflation rates, the inflation rates in the post corona world may remain high as compared to the rates in the pre-corona times as it may take supply some time to catch up with demand. However, the inflation rates will normalize over time. So, IRc-1 < IRc IRc+1 < IRc {Where, IRc-1 = Inflation rate before the corona pandemic; IRc = Inflation rate during and for a while after the lockdown; IRc+1 = Inflation rate after a considerable period after the lockdown} This is similar to what happened in the case of black death where the inflation rate during the blackdeath was greater than the inflation rate before and a few years after its occurrence as we can see in the case of England where the shortage of produce remained until 1375. So, IRb-1 < IRb IRc+1 < IRc {Where, taking the case of England IRb-1 = Inflation rate before the black death; IRb = Inflation rate during and for a while after the black death until 1374; IRb+1 = Inflation rate after the good harvest of 1375} In the black death, an adverse reaction ensued from 1375 when there was a good produce because given the same rate of wages and high supply of produce in the market, the profit function of the landlords was minimized. P b-1 ≥ P b (profits reduce or are at the same levels after black death considering inflation) P b > P b+1 (profits reduce in good harvests, wages stay the same  coercion of peasants) {Where, taking the case of England Pb-1 = Profit before the black death; Pb = Profit during and for a while after the black death until 1374; Pb+1 = Profit after the good harvest of 1375} Wherein, generally, P is the differentia between IR and W: P = IR – W In case of Corona, for companies where employees can work from home i.e. the RWP scenario: P c-1 ≤ P c (profits increase or stay the same as pre-covid levels because of rise in inflation and lowering of wages) P c > P c+1 (profits reduce marginally due to decrease in inflation but the wage rates are still low and do not bounce back to pre-covid levels) While this may seem like a loss for the companies that can work remotely because there is a reduction in the increased profit after the lockdown period, it is still a situation where wages remain low so the reduction in interest rates does not but so much into profits. However, since losses loom larger than gains, this comparative loss due to lowering inflation even though wage rates remain sticky and low may seem like a pain for the firms where remote work is possible. These firms from their reference point of high inflation and low wages during and immediately following the lockdown period may feel that they are at a loss and many ask the government for relief packages or even layoff employees. For companies where remote work is not possible, i.e. the RWP’ scenario, P c-1 > P c (they are unable to work during the pandemic so P c is zero or negative) P c < P c+1 (some production begins perhaps due to some stimulus from the government and either marginal profits are generated or losses are reduced) Here we can see that under both, RWP and RWP’ scenarios there is no collapse of system in the best case scenario where RWP’ firms can gain enough funds from the government to start operating again. In the worst case scenario, many RWP’ firms stop operating altogether and cannot be bailed out by the government. Hence, it may be possible that a decline in the unorganized manufacturing sector may be incipient, especially if a bailout from the government does not happen. Yet some service industries of the RWP’ type may still survive and those manufacturing units which are able to gain some infusion of funds (whether through a government bailout or any other means) - large enough to get them back into operations. In any case, a complete breakdown of a capitalist structure does not seem to be on the cards. However, countries (or areas) with a high density of RWP’ manufacturing industries in the unorganized sector, may witness decline. At the same time countries where there is a high concentration of high technology industries, may even remain sanguine. In terms of modes of production, it seems that the earlier forms of industries with hard core manufacturing jobs, with unorganized and semi-organized structures and where labour’s physical presence is of critical importance, may see a decline. At the same time, industries which sprang up as part of what is popularly termed as the industrialization 4.0 may recuperate and thrive. For countries where a large number of people are rendered jobless, there may be exacerbated challenges of keeping their population financially afloat until an economic innovation in the mode of production takes place. Now let us move to our second question of regional differences which has a few sub-questions as well: Scholars like Epstein and Pamuk have explained regional differences through the lens of institutions. We shall take a mixed approach and look at both, institutions and capabilities keeping a few regions in mind – USA, China, India, ASEAN, and Europe. The ongoing debate is generally around the hegemonic challenge of China to the USA and whether the latter will be able to maintain its hegemony or will the balance of power and economic leadership tilt in favour of China? Some have argued from a capabilities perspective considering that since supply chains in China are relatively unharmed by he COVID crisis, whether other countries like them or not they will cooperate with them (China). From this perspective, China’s soft power would develop post facto once the world realizes that they have to live under Chinese dominance. The world will be able to rationalize and/or may operate under cognitive dissonance. Figure 7. US President Donald Trump and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu sign the Phase One Trade Deal in January 2020 Source: Wikimedia Commons On the other hand, many argue that China by delaying the news of the corona outbreak to the world has lost on account of legitimacy and soft power by behaving irresponsibly. Since soft power is of strategic importance, China has lost on a key strategic advantage. From this perspective, it may be argued that other nations will actively reduce their stakes in China and will find other nations where they can rebuild their supply chains profitably. Whether due to the lack of trust or simply due to the fear of another health crisis in China, or both, companies are moving out of China and are investing in other countries after the COVID outbreak. As per many estimates, India, the ASEAN region, and other developing countries are to gain from it. Indeed there is a need to bring into analysis the whole institution of globalization and its impact on trade, allocation of resources etc. While many argue that the Coronavirus may lead to de-globalization, it may be necessary to keep in mind the distinctions between globalization and internationalization – as Peter Katzenstein has argued. According to Rawi Abdelal and Adam Seigal, the “institutional foundations of globalization-such as the rules that oblige governments to keep their markets open and the domestic and international politics that allow policymakers to liberalize their economies-have weakened considerably in the past few years”.19 However, internationalization, “i.e. exchanges across borders can and will continue, even as the transformative ideological process of breaking down barriers slows considerably”.20 These observations, seem to ring true and may even lead to multiple centres or blocs in the world enjoying regional power and leadership at least for the coming decades – much like how the world functioned in the 13th century in the pre-black-death era (only with different divisions of regional groups and now with more international contact and communication – internationalization). Figure 8. The 13th century world-system, as described by Janet Abu-Lughod Source: Wikimedia Commons A comparative analysis of the critical institutions of the United States, Europe, India, ASEAN, and China is a research enterprise that may give more sophisticated answers to the questions of global leadership. From the perspective of demographic analysis, the United States and in general the west may witness the outward migration of labour during the pandemic and their return may not be early enough. At any rate, the inward immigration into the United States will reduce considerably given the travel bas and strict border policies. This would mean that the United States would need to depend even more on labour saving technological innovations. If the US could avoid monopolistic tendencies, then it could gain from technological innovation amidst lower availability (or lower growth rate) of working population. Similar trends may take place in western Europe as well. In a way, while the black death reversed existing economic and power structures, the COVID crisis may make existing economic and power structures more acute or prominent. References 1-> Nicholas Wade, “Europe’s Plagues Came From China, Study Finds,” The New York Times, October 31, 2010, sec. Health, 2-> Boris V. Schmid et al., “Climate-Driven Introduction of the Black Death and Successive Plague Reintroductions into Europe,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 112, no. 10 (2015): 3020–25. 3-> Ibid 4-> Ibid 5-> Jim Robbins, “The Ecology of Disease,” The New York Times, sec. Sunday Review, accessed May 17, 2020 6-> “When the Wild Moves in,” The Week, accessed May 17, 2020 7-> Brian L. Pike et al., “The Origin and Prevention of Pandemics,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 50, no. 12 (2010): 1636–40. 8-> “WHO | Climate Change and Human Health - Risks and Responses. Summary.,” WHO, accessed May 17, 2020, 9-> Past And Present Publications: The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure And Economic Development In Pre-Industrial Europe,” accessed May 18, 2020, 10-> A. R. Bridbury, “The Black Death,” The Economic History Review 26, no. 4 (1973): 577–92, 11-> Robert brenner quoted by ŞEVKET PAMUK, “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 3 (2007): 289–317. 12-> ŞEVKET PAMUK, “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 3 (2007): 289–317. 13-> Ibid 14-> Ibid 15-> “The Statutes of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland [1807-1868/69],” accessed May 18, 2020, 16-> ŞEVKET PAMUK, “The Black Death and the Origins of the ‘Great Divergence’ across Europe, 1300-1600,” European Review of Economic History 11, no. 3 (2007): 289–317. 17-> Ibid 18-> Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). 19-> Rawi Abdelal and Adam Segal, “Has Globalization Passed Its Peak?,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007): 103–14. 20-> Ibid Bibliography Abdelal, Rawi, and Adam Segal. “Has Globalization Passed Its Peak?” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (2007): 103–14. “Black Death.” In Wikipedia, May 17, 2020. 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